THIS MATERIAL IS FOR CAREER PERSONNEL —PLEASE PASS  IT ON
Ttte   Permanent RIF
By Marc Anthony
After every var the military undergoes a "Reduction in Force«," In the post-
Vietnam RIF the Army is cutting down from over a million and a half men to 840,000.
And this time the RIF will become a permanent feature of Army life. The possibility
of "involuntary retirement" is the stick in a new carrot-and-stick system of "motivation" called the Qualitative Management Program» The carrot is higher pay and
better living conditions. The Pentagon hopes that by this new system it can (1) put
together an Army without the transient elements, draftees and draft-motivated volunteers, who proved so unreliable in Vietnam; and (2) keep its career personnel, particularly NCOs, "motivated" by doling out much stiffer punishments and slightly richer
rewards» The "motivation" of getting fired wasn't really there in the old Army.
There was a kind of civil-service guarantee that if a man did his job satisfactorily
he could continue for 20 or 30 years and retire with a decent pension»
This is how General Westmoreland describes the up-or-out system: "A new policy
regarding enlisted career management has been implemented and is intended to enhance the quality of the career enlisted force.. It provides for the selective
retention of the best soldiers, improved career progression and denial of re-enlistment to the nonprogressive and the nonproductive. Those who do not meet the criteria
established will be separated on a mandatory basis." And Sgt» Major Copeland, who
is supposed to speak for NCOs, but actually speaks to them on behalf of the brass,
says: "In today's Army, as in the world of sports, you are only as good as your
latest performance." In case that makes anyone nervous, the Smaj adds, "I have never
known a professional soldier who worried about his job or felt any loss of prestige."
The truth, however, is that every professional soldier, like everyone else who
works in this society, worries about his job and his standing. And now that the
up-or-out policy is here, soldiers have even more reason to worry» A review board
meets regularly at the Pentagon to go over the records of NCOs and specialists from
every pay grade and decide who to "weed out." They are dismissing about 37. —just
enough to make all NCOs nervous and insecure» Who doesn't know a man who has been
riffed? And a pretty good man at that! Apparently what matters to the brass is
not hard, effective work, but a certain classy image» You now need a high-school
diploma in order to get promoted above the rank of E-5» And this educational requirement may soon be raised to two years of college. NCOs also now have to hit
the books and do well on a test in their secondary MOS (not just their day-in,
day-out jobs), in order to stay in» Even the IQ score has been made an important
factor by the supposedly brilliant "analysts" at DOA. All these extraneous tests
reduce the significance of the one thing that really should count: how well a man
does his job.
It is NCOs and specialists, plus a relatively small number of officers who
do almost all the real work of the Army, outside of combat» Supply, maintenance,
clerical work, cooking, recruiting... all are the direct responsibility of career
enlisted men under the not-always-helpful "supervision" of officers» (And if an
NCO has low-ranking EMs or junior officers moving in and out of his unit, add
'training' to his job description.) But since the officer in the supervisory
position is the one who will get the vital credit if the unit performs well, the
NCO has to maintain a constant pretense that the officer is doing the more significant
work (even if the officer is doing no real work at all). The NCO must always pretend
that the "old man" (who is often a younger man) had a certain idea, got a certain job
done. If an NCO isn't self-effacing enough, he can expect a less than outstanding
efficiency report, no matter how well he does his job. The buffoon, the mother hen,
the alcoholic —these are familiar stereotypes that NCOs hide behind to conceal the
fact that uhey are serious and efficient men»  Officers like to be flattered, not
embarassed; the NCO who gets an outstanding rating is the one who does not make his
superiors conscious of the fact that he, the NCO, has done the real work of the
unit. In other words, NCOs cannot demand credit —though credit is rarely given
where due— and usually have to shuffle to build up the authority of the officers
above them» They have to appear less serious than they are, less intelligent,
less capable of taking initiative, less capable of leadership, less sensitive to
personnel problems within the unit... If one fine day Sgt Smith started acting
with the decisiveness and intelligence he is fully capable of, Major Jones would
feel threatened and angry, because the question would be implicitly raised: why
is 35 year old Sgt Smith worth $7,000 a year less than 30 year old Major Jones?
Why should Sgt Smith's family live in somewhat inferior housing? Why should
Major Jones get to evaluate Sgt Smith but not vice versa? After all, subordinates
know a great deal about the actual abilities of their "superiors.»»"
It used to be that the rating an officer gave an NCO determined whether or not
that man got promoted. This "personality contest" was bad enough; but now, with
the up-or-out policy, the officer's evaluation can determine whether the NCO is
to be thrown out onto a job market where there are almost no jobs, (And certainly
no good ones for a man who "leaves" the Army after, say, 12 years») To make matters
worse, officers are under pressure from above to get rid of a certain number of .
wm --all iß the same of "efficiency,," We are reminded that the big corporations
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OVER OVER OVER