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THIS MATERIAL IS FOR CAREER PERSONNEL —PLEASE PASS IT ON Ttte Permanent RIF By Marc Anthony After every var the military undergoes a "Reduction in Force«," In the post- Vietnam RIF the Army is cutting down from over a million and a half men to 840,000. And this time the RIF will become a permanent feature of Army life. The possibility of "involuntary retirement" is the stick in a new carrot-and-stick system of "motivation" called the Qualitative Management Program» The carrot is higher pay and better living conditions. The Pentagon hopes that by this new system it can (1) put together an Army without the transient elements, draftees and draft-motivated volunteers, who proved so unreliable in Vietnam; and (2) keep its career personnel, particularly NCOs, "motivated" by doling out much stiffer punishments and slightly richer rewards» The "motivation" of getting fired wasn't really there in the old Army. There was a kind of civil-service guarantee that if a man did his job satisfactorily he could continue for 20 or 30 years and retire with a decent pension» This is how General Westmoreland describes the up-or-out system: "A new policy regarding enlisted career management has been implemented and is intended to enhance the quality of the career enlisted force.. It provides for the selective retention of the best soldiers, improved career progression and denial of re-enlistment to the nonprogressive and the nonproductive. Those who do not meet the criteria established will be separated on a mandatory basis." And Sgt» Major Copeland, who is supposed to speak for NCOs, but actually speaks to them on behalf of the brass, says: "In today's Army, as in the world of sports, you are only as good as your latest performance." In case that makes anyone nervous, the Smaj adds, "I have never known a professional soldier who worried about his job or felt any loss of prestige." The truth, however, is that every professional soldier, like everyone else who works in this society, worries about his job and his standing. And now that the up-or-out policy is here, soldiers have even more reason to worry» A review board meets regularly at the Pentagon to go over the records of NCOs and specialists from every pay grade and decide who to "weed out." They are dismissing about 37. —just enough to make all NCOs nervous and insecure» Who doesn't know a man who has been riffed? And a pretty good man at that! Apparently what matters to the brass is not hard, effective work, but a certain classy image» You now need a high-school diploma in order to get promoted above the rank of E-5» And this educational requirement may soon be raised to two years of college. NCOs also now have to hit the books and do well on a test in their secondary MOS (not just their day-in, day-out jobs), in order to stay in» Even the IQ score has been made an important factor by the supposedly brilliant "analysts" at DOA. All these extraneous tests reduce the significance of the one thing that really should count: how well a man does his job. It is NCOs and specialists, plus a relatively small number of officers who do almost all the real work of the Army, outside of combat» Supply, maintenance, clerical work, cooking, recruiting... all are the direct responsibility of career enlisted men under the not-always-helpful "supervision" of officers» (And if an NCO has low-ranking EMs or junior officers moving in and out of his unit, add 'training' to his job description.) But since the officer in the supervisory position is the one who will get the vital credit if the unit performs well, the NCO has to maintain a constant pretense that the officer is doing the more significant work (even if the officer is doing no real work at all). The NCO must always pretend that the "old man" (who is often a younger man) had a certain idea, got a certain job done. If an NCO isn't self-effacing enough, he can expect a less than outstanding efficiency report, no matter how well he does his job. The buffoon, the mother hen, the alcoholic —these are familiar stereotypes that NCOs hide behind to conceal the fact that uhey are serious and efficient men» Officers like to be flattered, not embarassed; the NCO who gets an outstanding rating is the one who does not make his superiors conscious of the fact that he, the NCO, has done the real work of the unit. In other words, NCOs cannot demand credit —though credit is rarely given where due— and usually have to shuffle to build up the authority of the officers above them» They have to appear less serious than they are, less intelligent, less capable of taking initiative, less capable of leadership, less sensitive to personnel problems within the unit... If one fine day Sgt Smith started acting with the decisiveness and intelligence he is fully capable of, Major Jones would feel threatened and angry, because the question would be implicitly raised: why is 35 year old Sgt Smith worth $7,000 a year less than 30 year old Major Jones? Why should Sgt Smith's family live in somewhat inferior housing? Why should Major Jones get to evaluate Sgt Smith but not vice versa? After all, subordinates know a great deal about the actual abilities of their "superiors.»»" It used to be that the rating an officer gave an NCO determined whether or not that man got promoted. This "personality contest" was bad enough; but now, with the up-or-out policy, the officer's evaluation can determine whether the NCO is to be thrown out onto a job market where there are almost no jobs, (And certainly no good ones for a man who "leaves" the Army after, say, 12 years») To make matters worse, officers are under pressure from above to get rid of a certain number of . wm --all iß the same of "efficiency,," We are reminded that the big corporations r?i .nr OVER OVER OVER
Object Description
Title | The permanent RIF |
Editor | Anthony, Marc |
Place of publication | Seaside, California |
Publisher | Common Sense |
Publication date | 1972 |
Language | English |
Country | United States |
State | California |
Digital Format | XML |
Publisher-Electronic | Wisconsin Historical Society |
Publication Date-Electronic | 2016 |
Rights | Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited. |
Owner | Brünn, Harris Watts Collection - Serials and Press Release Soldiers Movements, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam; Wisconsin Historical Society |
Type | Text |
Digital identifier | giNewsletter565000 |
Description
Title | p. 1 |
Language | English |
Digital Format | JPEG2000 |
Publisher-Electronic | Wisconsin Historical Society |
Publication Date-Electronic | 2016 |
Rights | Copyright belongs to the individuals who created them or the organizations for which they worked. We share them here strictly for non-profit educational purposes. If you believe that you possess copyright to material included here, please contact us at asklibrary@wisconsinhistory.org. Under the fair use provisions of the U.S. copyright law, teachers and students are free to reproduce any document for nonprofit classroom use. Commercial use of copyright-protected material is generally prohibited. |
Owner | Brünn, Harris Watts Collection - Serials and Press Release Soldiers Movements, International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam; Wisconsin Historical Society |
Full text | THIS MATERIAL IS FOR CAREER PERSONNEL —PLEASE PASS IT ON Ttte Permanent RIF By Marc Anthony After every var the military undergoes a "Reduction in Force«" In the post- Vietnam RIF the Army is cutting down from over a million and a half men to 840,000. And this time the RIF will become a permanent feature of Army life. The possibility of "involuntary retirement" is the stick in a new carrot-and-stick system of "motivation" called the Qualitative Management Program» The carrot is higher pay and better living conditions. The Pentagon hopes that by this new system it can (1) put together an Army without the transient elements, draftees and draft-motivated volunteers, who proved so unreliable in Vietnam; and (2) keep its career personnel, particularly NCOs, "motivated" by doling out much stiffer punishments and slightly richer rewards» The "motivation" of getting fired wasn't really there in the old Army. There was a kind of civil-service guarantee that if a man did his job satisfactorily he could continue for 20 or 30 years and retire with a decent pension» This is how General Westmoreland describes the up-or-out system: "A new policy regarding enlisted career management has been implemented and is intended to enhance the quality of the career enlisted force.. It provides for the selective retention of the best soldiers, improved career progression and denial of re-enlistment to the nonprogressive and the nonproductive. Those who do not meet the criteria established will be separated on a mandatory basis." And Sgt» Major Copeland, who is supposed to speak for NCOs, but actually speaks to them on behalf of the brass, says: "In today's Army, as in the world of sports, you are only as good as your latest performance." In case that makes anyone nervous, the Smaj adds, "I have never known a professional soldier who worried about his job or felt any loss of prestige." The truth, however, is that every professional soldier, like everyone else who works in this society, worries about his job and his standing. And now that the up-or-out policy is here, soldiers have even more reason to worry» A review board meets regularly at the Pentagon to go over the records of NCOs and specialists from every pay grade and decide who to "weed out." They are dismissing about 37. —just enough to make all NCOs nervous and insecure» Who doesn't know a man who has been riffed? And a pretty good man at that! Apparently what matters to the brass is not hard, effective work, but a certain classy image» You now need a high-school diploma in order to get promoted above the rank of E-5» And this educational requirement may soon be raised to two years of college. NCOs also now have to hit the books and do well on a test in their secondary MOS (not just their day-in, day-out jobs), in order to stay in» Even the IQ score has been made an important factor by the supposedly brilliant "analysts" at DOA. All these extraneous tests reduce the significance of the one thing that really should count: how well a man does his job. It is NCOs and specialists, plus a relatively small number of officers who do almost all the real work of the Army, outside of combat» Supply, maintenance, clerical work, cooking, recruiting... all are the direct responsibility of career enlisted men under the not-always-helpful "supervision" of officers» (And if an NCO has low-ranking EMs or junior officers moving in and out of his unit, add 'training' to his job description.) But since the officer in the supervisory position is the one who will get the vital credit if the unit performs well, the NCO has to maintain a constant pretense that the officer is doing the more significant work (even if the officer is doing no real work at all). The NCO must always pretend that the "old man" (who is often a younger man) had a certain idea, got a certain job done. If an NCO isn't self-effacing enough, he can expect a less than outstanding efficiency report, no matter how well he does his job. The buffoon, the mother hen, the alcoholic —these are familiar stereotypes that NCOs hide behind to conceal the fact that uhey are serious and efficient men» Officers like to be flattered, not embarassed; the NCO who gets an outstanding rating is the one who does not make his superiors conscious of the fact that he, the NCO, has done the real work of the unit. In other words, NCOs cannot demand credit —though credit is rarely given where due— and usually have to shuffle to build up the authority of the officers above them» They have to appear less serious than they are, less intelligent, less capable of taking initiative, less capable of leadership, less sensitive to personnel problems within the unit... If one fine day Sgt Smith started acting with the decisiveness and intelligence he is fully capable of, Major Jones would feel threatened and angry, because the question would be implicitly raised: why is 35 year old Sgt Smith worth $7,000 a year less than 30 year old Major Jones? Why should Sgt Smith's family live in somewhat inferior housing? Why should Major Jones get to evaluate Sgt Smith but not vice versa? After all, subordinates know a great deal about the actual abilities of their "superiors.»»" It used to be that the rating an officer gave an NCO determined whether or not that man got promoted. This "personality contest" was bad enough; but now, with the up-or-out policy, the officer's evaluation can determine whether the NCO is to be thrown out onto a job market where there are almost no jobs, (And certainly no good ones for a man who "leaves" the Army after, say, 12 years») To make matters worse, officers are under pressure from above to get rid of a certain number of . wm --all iß the same of "efficiency," We are reminded that the big corporations r?i .nr OVER OVER OVER |
Type | Text |
Digital identifier | giNewsletter565001 |