Wisconsin in the War of the Rebellion, Vol. 1

              482 WISCONSIN IN  THE WAE.
first day of the battle we had not men enough to extend our lines the whole distance b^etween them—two and a half miles.
The question had been considered whether to erect fortifi¬ cations there, and Grant, Sherman, and others had decided that it would be injurious to the morale of our men, and that they were able to meet the enemy in the open field. General Sherman afterward testified, that if there was a mistake in placing the army there it was not General Grant's, but insisted that there was no mistake, and added, " It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any." But all this does not satisfy. Every precaution should have been taken to spare life. If " courage and pluck" must be tested, let it be under the most economical arrangements. The fact was, probably, that the risk was incurred because, as General Grant said, he did not believe the enemy would make a determined attack, but only a reconnoissance in force. Hon¬ orable E. D. Holton, a Wisconsin allotment commissioner, who was upon the field soon after the battle, in regard to the question of General Grant's advance across the river before BuoU was near, then wrote : " I do not see how a. careful and thoughtful general should not have given particular attention to this point, especially when he was dealing with an opponent so wary, so cunning, and so able as Beauregard;" and such queries will continue to arise while history is read.
General Grant's force was distributed in five divisions, under Generals Prentiss, McClernand, W. H. L. Wallace, Hurlbut, and Sherman. Our forces faced south and west; Prentiss at the left, a mile and a half from the landing, McClernand at his right, Sherman still farther at the right and in the advance, near to Shiloh Church, and in the rear Hurlbut, to support the left wing, and Wallace to support the right.
On Friday, April 3d, the rebels began their march toward the Federal lines, taking five days' rations, with the calculation of getting whatever else they might want in our captured camps. From spies in the country, Beauregard knew the position and number of our forces, and he and his generals and troops confidently expected to reach and defeat us before Buell's arrival with reinforcements.  They advanced less rapidly